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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0943

INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7606

RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0140

RUMJNG/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 4569

RUMJSA/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0152

RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1734

RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8001

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 2176

RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1243

RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1084

RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1347

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2612

BT

EZ1:

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 07116

EZ2:

CINCPAC FOR POLAD, BEIJING PASS SHENYANG

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

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SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS OF CHINA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

2. SUMMARY: DURING RECENT TALKS HERE, A US ACADEMIC CHINA-WATCHER FOUND SOVIET COUNTERPARTS RELAXED ABOUT SINO-US TIES, SAVORING WHAT THE SOVIETS VIEW AS A CHINESE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS THE US. THE SOVIETS WERE SHARPLY DIVIDED ON THE MEANING OF CHINESE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC REFORMS. END SUMMARY.

3. US ACADEMIC CHINA-WATCHER PARRIS CHANG (PROTECT) HAS SHARED WITH US IMPRESSIONS GAINED DURING MAY 15-27 TALKS WITH SOVIET ACADEMIC AND OFFICIAL CHINA-WATCHERS. CHANG, WHO PREVIOUSLY VISITED MOSCOW IN MID-1983 AND ON TWO EARLIER OCCASIONS, WAS INVITED THIS TIME BY THE INSTITUTE OF THE FAR EAST. BESIDES HIS HOSTS, CHANG MET WITH CPSU INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT CONSULTANT M. L. TITARENKO, MFA FIRST FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT CHIEF I. A. ROGACHEV, MFA DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY RECTOR S. L. TIKHVINSKIY (ALL CHINA WATCHERS), AND ORIENTAL INSTITUTE EAST ASIAN SCHOLARS.

4. COMPARED WITH 1983, CHANG FOUND THE SOVIETS RELAXED ABOUT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS, AND GLOATING ABOUT THE RECENT CHINESE DECISION NOT TO RECEIVE U.S. NAVAL PORT CALLS. SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS POSITED GROWING CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. AS A MAJOR SOVIET GAIN. AT THE SAME TIME, ALMOST ALL SOVIETS WERE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, USUALLY PREDICTING THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A MAJOR TURNING POINT IN RELATIONS SUCH AS THE 1972 SINO-U.S. SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OR THE 1978 SINO-U.S. NORMALIZATION COMMUNIQUE.

5. WHILE MOST SOVIETS PREDICTED STEADY, INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, SOME SOVIETS EVINCED OPTIMISM THAT A LEADERSHIP SUMMIT MEETING AND RESTORATION OF PARTY-TO-PARTY TIES WOULD OCCUR WITHIN FIVE YEARS. ONLY INSTITUTE OF THE FAR EAST FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT CHIEF A. G. YAKOVLEV ARGUED EBULLIENTLY THAT HU YAOBANG'S (ORAL) GREETINGS TO GORBACHEV CONSTITUTED THE OPENING OF PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONS. ROGACHEV, HOWEVER, FLATLY DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF PARTY-TO-PARTY TIES.

6. AN INSTITUTE OF THE FAR EAST ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TOLD CHANG THAT SOVIET SCHOLARS GENERALLY AGREE THAT CHINA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE SIMILAR TO THE SOVIET NEP REFORMS. HOWEVER, SAID THE OFFICIAL, SOVIET CHINA-WATCHERS ARE SHARPLY DIVIDED ON THE MEANING AND DIRECTION OF CHINESE REFORMS. SOME BELIEVE THAT, LIKE THE NEP REFORMS, CHINA'S REFORMS WILL PROVE TO BE TACTICAL AND TEMPORARY. OTHERS (INCLUDING THE INSTITUTE OFFICIAL) BELIEVE THE CHINESE REFORMS WILL HAVE A PROFOUND IMPACT ON CHINA'S FUTURE POLITICAL COURSE. WITHOUT PASSING JUDGMENT ON THE REFORMS AS SUCH, TITARENKO SAID THE US, JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE ARE INTENT ON EXPLOITING CHINA'S

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MODERNIZATION NEEDS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES.

7. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TITARENKO, CHANG FELT MOST SOVIET COUNTERPARTS WERE NOT PERCEPTIVE ABOUT CHINESE LEADERSHIP POLITICS. TITARENKO IDENTIFIED DENG XIAOPING AND ZHAO ZIYANG AS HARD-LINE ANTI-SOVIETS BASED ON THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE CONTRASTED DENG AND ZHAO WITH HU YAOBANG, PENG ZHEN AND CHEN YUN, WHO, SAID TITARENKO, RARELY SPOKE OUT ON ANTI-SOVIET THEMES.

8. COMMENT: WHAT CHANG HEARD FROM HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS TRACKS CLOSELY WITH WHAT WE HAVE HEARD AND REPORTED PREVIOUSLY ABOUT SOVIET VIEWS OF CHINA, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET DIVISION OF OPINION ON CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORMS AND SOVIET CATEGORIZATION OF CHINESE LEADERS INTO ANTI-SOVIET AND "HOPEFUL" CAMPS. IN MEETINGS OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, INSTITUTE OF THE FAR EAST OFFICIALS HAVE EVINCED CONFIDENCE THAT CHINESE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION CINCPAC FOR POLAD, BEIJING PASS SHENYANG  
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AND INTEREST IN GOOD RELATIONS ARE RAPIDLY SHIFTING, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. THEY CITED IN PARTICULAR CHINA'S MOVEMENT FROM FORMER LINKAGE OF PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO THE "THREE OBSTACLES" TOWARD CHINA'S RECENT POSITION THAT "POLITICAL" AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS CAN IMPROVE DESPITE THE "THREE OBSTACLES." END COMMENT.

9. CHANG FOUND NO SOVIET INTEREST IN TAIWAN OR KOREAN MATTERS, DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF TAIWAN AND IMMINENT VISIT TO PYONGYANG. CHANG WILL VISIT PYONGYANG (FOR THE FIRST TIME) MAY 31-JUNE 7, STOPPING OFF IN BEIJING IN AND OUT OF NORTH KOREA. CHANG'S CURRENT RESEARCH TOPIC IS CHINESE CADRE REFORM, A SUBJECT TO WHICH HE HAS BROUGHT INSIGHTS GAINED FROM INTERVIEWING CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE U.S., ESPECIALLY SCIONS OF ELITE FAMILIES.  
HARTMAN

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